EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
SUISCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 A YEAR. SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS.
EDITORIAL BOARD.
JOHN F. BAKER, Chairman.
FRANK KENNA, Graduate, FLAVEL ROBERTSON,
Business Manager. Secretary
JOSEPH A. ALLARD, JR., JAMES A. STEVENSON, JR.
HENRY C. CLAcRK, BUCKINGHAM P. MERRIMAN,
ALEXANDER W. CREEDON, C. FLOYDE GRIDER,
CLEAVELAND J. RicE, THOMAS C. FLOOD,
LEONARD 0. RYAN, IRVING M. ENGEL,
Published monthly from November to June, by students of the Yale Law School.
P. 0. Address, Box 893, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of
his subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a
continuation of the subscription is desired.
WHEN IS EVIDENCE OF CRIMES, OTHER THAN THE ONE CHARGED,
ADMISSIBLE?
It was recently held in Melton. v. State, I4O S. XV. (Tex.), 23o,
that in a trial for the theft of certain mules, evidence that the
accused had previously stolen other mules in substantially the
same manner was properly admitted. To understand the position
taken by the court a brief statement of the facts is necessary. The
accused represented to the prosecutor that he wanted some goods
hauled. Prosecutor at the request of accused drove his own mules
for that purpose, and was accompanied by accused. While on the
way to the village the accused made an offer to buy the mules, but
no sale was consummated. Upon arriving at the village, the prose-
cutor drove the mules into a yard, where he left them and accom-
panied the accused by train to a neighboring town where the
accused pretended to be going on business. Falsely representing
that he had private business to transact, the accused got away
from the prosecutor and took the train back to the place where
the mules had been left, took the mules out of the yard and sold
them for five hundred dollars and departed from that communty
for a time. On trial for stealing the mules, his defense was that
he'had purchased the mules from the prosecutor in good faith. In
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admitting evidence of other thefts by the accused, the lower court
said that as the other transactions were almost identical with the
one of which the accused was being tried, and the defense being
a purchase in good faith, evidence of other transactions was
admissible, to show defendant's intent and system. The upper
court sustained the holding, saying that in such cases evidence of
former crimes is admissible on the grounds, (i) that it may be
used to show the intent with which the accused acted toward the
subject matter of the crime, and (2) to show a system of opera-
tion.
This Texas decision raises one of the most difficult questions in
the law of evidence; whether evidence of crimes, similar in their
method of perpetration, and near in point of time, yet uncon-
nected with each other, although all traceable to the one fixed
purpose, should ever be admissible.
The general rule as laid down in i Bish. New Cr. Proc. (4 ed.,
Sec. T120) that the state cannot prove against the defendant any
crime not alleged, either as a foundation for a separate punish-
ment or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the one charged,
even though he has put his character in issue. "This rule," said
the Court in People v. Mollineaux, 168 N. Y., 264, "is rooted in
that jealous regard for the liberty of the individual which has dis-
tinguished our jurisprudence from all others, at least from the
birth of Magna Charta. It is the product of that same humane
and enlightened public spirit which, speaking through our com-
mon law, has decreed that every person charged with commission
of a crime shall be protected by the presumption of innocence
until he has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
However closely the courts have been inclined to follow the
general rule, they have been forced to make a number of excep-
tions to it. These exceptions have their foundations in ihe fact
that in many cases it would be practically impossible to secure a
conviction if the general rule were rigidly adhered to. State v.
Spray, 174 1ylo., 569, 578. In People v. Mollineaux, supra, these
exceptions are well classified and ably commented upon. In that
opinion the Court said that proof of another crime is competent
to prove the specific crime charged only when it tends to estab-
lish (i) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident;
(4) a common scheme or plan embracing two or more crimes so
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-related to each other that the proof of one tends to establish the
other, or (5) the identity of the person charged with the com-
mission of the crime in question.
In State v. Spray, 174 Mo., 569, the court approved of the
decision in People v. Mollineaux, and held that in larceny cases
the facts constituting the offense are sufficient evidence of the
intent and that evidence of similar crimes, committed under like
circumstances, and about the same time, is not admissible. But in
Callards v. State, 40 S. W. (Tex.), 974 (not reported in State
reports), it was held, where accused was on trial on a charge of
embezzlement by putting money received for sale of goods into
his pocket and not ringing it up on the cash register, that evidence
of former embezzlements in like manner were admissible to show
the system pursued by the accused.
In People v. Zucker, 40 N. Y. Sup., 766, where defendant was
on trial for arson consisting in burning a building in New York
for the purpose of obtaining insurance money, the court admitted
evidence of the burning of another building by the defendant in
Newark a few days before and for the same purpose. The
decisions were based on the ground that both acts were part of
one common scheme, to obtain money fraudulently from insur-
ance companies.
Probably the most extreme holding along this line is that of
Frazer v. State, 135 Ind., 38. Defendant was on trial charged
with the commission of a certain burglary. The court admitted
evidence that other burglaries were committed in that community
the same night, and that footprints found about one of the other
houses entered corresponded with shoes worn by defendant. The
court admitted this evidence on the ground that it showed a gen-
eral system of operations.
There is another line of cases in which the general rule does
not apply, and yet which do not come under the exceptions usually
mentioned in the cases. These cases are referred to in People Z.
Castro, 133 Cal., 12, where the Court said, "The doctrine appears
to be fairly well settled that in actions of adultery, seduction, etc.,
evidence of sexual intercourse between the parties, both before
and after the particular crime charged, may be introduced in evi-
dence as tending to sustain the main allegation." This view is
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upheld by the following cases: People v. Koller, 142 Cal., 521;
State v. Witham, 72 Me., 571; State v. Williams, 76 Me., 481;
Alsabrooks v. State, 52 Ala., 25.
From an examination of the cases it would seem that the hold-
ing of the principal case is a logical,: although extreme application
of the principal that evidence of former crimes is admissible to
show the intent with which the accused acted relative to the sub-
ject matter of the crime.
